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Abstract 
Cloud computing provides an in-built platform to the users with easy and on-demand access to different system 
level services for creating virtual machines (VM) with efficient utilization of hardware, computing and network 
resources. This allows users to remotely execute large number of applications across various domains such as, 
health-care, utility services, e-governance, etc. There are different cloud operating platforms for creation and 
management of virtual machines through various system or application services. For example, openstack, oracle 
virtualbox, Microsoft HyperV are widely used operating platform. Virtual machine migration (VMM) is one of such 
important system services that used for smooth the progress of system maintenance, load management, fault 
tolerance, secure and safe service offerings. Virtual Machine live migration service transfers an active VM from one 
physical machine to another across different data centres. It involves a sequence of operations in iteration for 
migrating execution context of a VM to the destination machine. These operations are dependent on schedule, 
availability of resources and overall timing constraints. On the other hand, the migration process involves 
transferring the control data over a communication channel with a shared storage. Due to the above mentioned 
complexities of VM migration process, any security failures during the migration may cause transfer of incorrect 
VM instance to a data centre and which in turn may lead to exposure of the data centre to the attackers. This may be 
manifested as catastrophic system failure, degradation of system performance, load balancing and in long run may 
result collapse of the data centre.  In this paper we studied various security vulnerability in different cloud platforms. 
These vulnerability will help the security developers to design a secured cloud platform. 
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1. Introduction 
The open and multi-tenant computing platform with remote execution of application, sharing of resources, 
dependency with underlying networks with fine-grained accessibility opens up various functional and security 
threats  in cloud platform. 
Security Challenges in Cloud Computing Platform: Virualization is the key enabler of Cloud computing platform 
to emulate the system behavior in virtual machines. In addition, the key agents of the cloud platform includes 
hypervisor, Virtual Machines (VMs), Operating systems in VMs, software running on those OSs and the underlying 
communication network. Security, in the context of computing platform, refers to the exposé and modification of 
data and services which may be considered responsive. Sensitive or responsive data are (i) software data (program 
data in memory, on disk, or in other forms of storage); (ii) software and hardware operational state (resource 
allocation levels, program execution paths, etc.); (iii) control and network channels. Here software refers to the 
hypervisor, VM, OSs in VMs and applications running in VMs6.
Security in Cloud Network Infrastructure: VMs are protected using various security mechanisms including 
firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention, IPsec VPN, etc. While VMs migrate around, not only the memory and 
the states on the hypervisor need to be migrated, but also the network states including security policy. Failing to do 
so, may expose the running services on the migrated VM to security problems. A simple example of this case is 
firewall access control lists (ACLs). Assume that a VM migrates to a new location under a different firewall 
configuration. On one hand, if the ACLs at the new location are more permissive than those at the original location, 
some packets that should be blocked may be allowed. This may open up several security vulnerabilities to the VM. 
On the other hand, if they are less permissive, some packets that should be allowed may be blocked. Furthermore, 
some virtual machines running services might require specific filtering rules. As VMs are vigorously and frequently 
transfered between hosts, manually managing the complex firewall rules can be time-consuming and error-prone. 
The similar issue arise when dealing with intrusion detection and preventions configurations as well as IPsec VPN 
settings. Furthermore, scale and complexity of data centers are continually increasing, which makes it difficult to 
rely on the administrators to update and validate the security mechanisms. 
Challenges in administration and planning level: The complex operations in cloud computing is handled by 
proper administrative planning. In some of the operations though the administrator has control, still there are 
vulnerability exists. For example, the VM Migration auction process involves a sequence of communications 
performed through an in-secured channel i.e, Internet, it is prone to various security breaches. The VM migration 
auction involves multi party receiver and each CSP controls the migration auction by running a distributed biding 
application. Thus, auction process may expose the cloud services especially migration process to integrity and 
confidentiality attacks. This may in turn lead to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. On the other hand, incorrect 
authentication and agreements between CSPs and host-level security mis-configurations may allow attackers gaining 
control of target hosts and the underlying network infrastructure. Moreover, due to weak cryptographic mechanisms 
traffic can be captured and tampered during the communications between CSPs by running cryptanalysis techniques 
which in turn lead to data loss. 
2. Literature Review 
In this section, we present the literature review with respect to three main axes of research that can be connected to 
our work: Virtual machine migration in cloud computing, analysis of security context in VM migration, and VM 
migration planning with respect to security, capacity requirements. In addition, we have discussed policy 
consistency analysis initiatives for detecting and resolving anomalies and conflicts within a given security policy 
configuration. In the following, we will present some of the most relevant contributions in all three research areas. 
Ashino et al. presented EDAMP method for VM migration between heterogeneous hypervisor implementation1. To 
the best of our knowledge this is the only work which considers VM migration problem in heterogeneous cloud 
environment. Since we analyze the live migration problem in heterogeneous hypervisor implementation, here we 
present a brief description of the EDAMP method. The various phases of VM migration under EDAMP are as 
follows. In initialization phase, this method installs an uniform OS distribution on all VMs. EDAMP generates a 
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local list to identify a set of files in each VM. This list contains information about each file on the virtual HDD that 
includes the file path, file size, and time stamp attached to the VM. After this phase, the method generates a shared 
list that includes various attributes of shared files used by different VMs (the shared list creation block ).To generate 
this shared list, hypervisor has to integrate the lists from different virtual machines. In the next phase the source and 
destination VM are identified. In this phase, hypervisor also assigns the required resources to the source and 
accordingly the local VM list is updated. After this, EDAMP generates migration data by finding a difference set Ls 
- SL, where SL indicates the shared file list between source and destination VM at time t (initiation phase) and Ls is 
the local file list of source VM at time after resource allocation. In deployment phase, the required resources are 
installed based on the migration data file under the control of destination hypervisor. This allows the OS to boot up 
in the destination. In this approach, the authors discussed only about the VM state migration. However, there was no 
discussion regarding security context migration. 
Saeed et al.2 described a formal approach for the virtual machine migration planning that is to find a sequence of 
migration steps such that all security, dependency and performance requirements are satisfied. Migrating VMs in an 
arbitrary sequence may violate the above discussed requirements. The authors discussed the VMM-Planner, a 
framework that finds a sequence of migration steps in which the current VMs placement converges to the target 
placement without violating dependency, risk, and capacity requirements. VMM-Planner encodes VM migration 
planning problem into a constraint satisfaction problem in which all requirements, the current cloud status, and the 
target placement are formally encoded as constraints. Then, the modelled constraints are fed to a satisfiability 
modulo theory (SMT) solver. The solver finds a satisfiable solution to the given instance, if such solution exists. The 
provided solution is the VM migration sequence that can be performed to execute the live VM migration process 
safely. From our analysis, we have observed that (i) security context are not incorporated in VMM planning. (ii) the 
migration sequence does not tagged with time (iii) Only serial sequencing of migration steps are discussed, But, the 
parallelization of migration steps may be considered for improving system performance. (iv)The affect of functional 
faults and security violations in each step of VMM plan has not been analyzed.  
Network elements such as stateful firewalls contribute in enforcing security in Cloud platform. During VM 
migration the security enforced to the VM, need to be transfered to the destination machine. Zahra et al3 presented a 
framework for security context migration in a firewall secured VM environment. In their work, the security context 
transfer approach along with implementation has been discussed. The Security Context (SC) module in the 
hypervisor extracts SC of source VM and transfer the SC to destination host along with VM state. SC migrator 
establishes a connection (TCP) between source and destination. At the destination side, the SC module enforces the 
security context. Authors evaluated the work using three test case scenarios. In the first test case, a VM migration 
was performed without any SC information. In the second test case, a VM was migrated with static SC information. 
In the third test case, migrated a VM with static and dynamic SC information. The test cases are not enough to proof 
the correctness and consistency of the security context migration. In addition, this method consider IP address does 
not change after VM migration to a different host. 
Researchers developed a way for an attacker to gain administrative control of some cloud platforms during a live 
migration, employing a man-in-the-middle attack to modify the code used for authentication. Jon Oberheide et al.4
demonstrated the  importance of securing the VM migration process. The authors classified the threats into control 
plane, data plane, and migration module threats. The authors developed a tool, Xensploit, to perform man-in-the-
middle attacks on the live migration of virtual machines. The tool operates by manipulating the memory of a VM as 
it traverses the network during a live migration. Simple Memory Manipulation and buffer overflow attacks are 
demonstrated in XEN platform. The authentication process in VMware Virtual Infrastructure was exploited by sshd 
Authentication Manipulation.  
Cloud Calculus5 is a formal framework to express and verify the VM deployment and migration process in the cloud 
from the security point of view. More precisely, this framework allows expressing the deployment and migration of 
VMs along with their related security policies, and then verifying the preservation of the security after migration. 
This paper only discuss about the firewall rule verification and migration. However, the security context related to 
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other security devices are not presented. The security policy mis-configurations verification in the cloud data centers 
are not discussed. 
In this paper, our main focus is to define the various vulnerability in different cloud operating platforms. In the next 
section , we listed the vulnerability considering Xen, Virtualbox and HyperV virtualization techniques.  
3. Vulnerability in Various Platforms 
3.1. Xen
Control plane attack: The entire state of the virtual machine is exposed to the device module or the hypervisor and 
if in case the attacker gains access of the hypervisor all the data of the virtual machine including the kernel states as 
well as the inputs from the keyboard will be compromised. 
Data plane attack: During the process of live migration, xen doesn’t encrypt the migration data like the memory 
states of the virtual machine, dirty pages etc.  and any third party can monitor the network used for transmission to 
access the sensible information and even launch active attacks on the virtual machine. 
Migration module attack: Also the migration module protocols are transmitted as clear text and the attacker can 
sniff into the network and inject some malicious code into the module to subvert the migration process. 
3.2. Virtualbox 
Control plane attack: Without proper access control rules, any node in the data centre can emerge as an attacker. 
Since many initiators use the same shared storage which is a compulsion for the live migration to take place, control 
plane attacks can be performed. 
 Data plane attack: When teleporting a machine, the data stream through which the machine's memory contents are 
transferred from one host to another is not encrypted. A third party with access to the network through which the 
data is transferred could therefore intercept that data7.
3.3. HyperV 
Control plane attack:  If Hyper-V servers don’t belong to the common active directory forest, CredSSP based 
authentication is used which works by passing credentials to a remote computer to complete the authentication. If 
the remote system is compromised, then the credentials as well as live migration will be compromised. 
4. Possible Control Plane Attacks 
4.1. Denial of Service Attack 
The target machine is saturated with a large number of sham migration requests from the attacker physical machine 
to avert it from responding to legitimate migration requests in the given time span. Platform: Xen, Virtualbox, 
Hyper-V 
4.2. Migration of Corrupted VM to legitimate Host 
By initiating unauthorized outgoing migrations, an attacker may cause guest VMs to be live migrated to the 
legitimate machine and gain full control over the host. Due to inter VM communication, if access policies are not 
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defined for controlled communication, a malicious VM can attack other VM running on the target machine to which 
guest VM was migrated. Platform: Xen, Virtualbox, Hyper-V 
4.3. VM Diversify 
By initiating unauthorized incoming migrations, an attacker may cause guest VMs to be live migrated to the 
attacker’s machine and gain full control over guest VMs. Platform: Xen, Virtualbox, Hyper-V 
5. Possible Data Plane Attacks 
5.1. Information Leakage 
By monitoring the migration path and network stream, the attacker can do this passive attack and extract sensible 
information from the memory of vm which is being migrated. Platform: Xen, Virtualbox 
5.2. Man in Middle Attack 
An attacker tries to include some malicious information into on-going conversation between sender and receiver and 
to have knowledge of the important data transferred between them. Platform: Xen, Virtualbox 
6. Possible Attacks on Migration Module 
6.1. Software vulnerabilities 
The attacker can compromise the vm migration by using software vulnerabilities like stack overflow, heap overflow 
and integer overflow to inject malicious code into the migration module. Platform: Xen 
6.2. Replay attack 
Since the control messages of live migration protocols are sent unprotected, the attacker can access the credentials 
and replay the process of migration to by sending it’s vm to the host. Platform: Xen 
6.3. Masquerading 
After having access to the credentials of the machines, the attacker may modify the migration module to suspend the 
ongoing migrating process and send it’s own vm impersonating to be the original source. Platform: Xen 
Table 1 List of possible attacks on various platforms 
Plane Attack Platform 
Control plane 
Denial of service Xen, Virtualbox, Hyper-V 
False resource advertising Xen, Virtualbox, Hyper-v 
Migrating corrupted VM to legitimate 
host 
Xen, Virtualbox, Hyper-v 
VM diversify Xen, Virtualbox 
Data plane Man in the middle attack Xen, Virtualbox 
Information leakage Xen, Virtualbox 
Migration module 
Software vulnerabilities Xen 
Replay Attacks 
Masquerading 
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we systematically investigate the possible attacks to various cloud platforms.  The goal of this 
research is to ensure functional correctness and security for cloud computing infrastructure. To achieve that it is 
necessary to analyze the security attacks and then it is required to help the developers to come up with secured 
integrated solutions. 
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